Elisabeth Camp's guest appearances

Elisabeth Camp

London Aesthetics Forum, at the Institute of Philosophy

Five Questions

Robinson's Podcast

Michele Moody-Adams

Tommie Shelby

Kwame Anthony Appiah

Elizabeth Barnes

Guy Longworth

Rae Langton

Derek Matravers

Jonathan Wolff

Jennifer Hornsby

Gideon Rosen

Joshua Landy

Susan Wolf

Miranda Fricker

Susan James

Tim Crane

OwlTail

Emily Dickinson

Elisabeth Camp is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, where she works on the philosophy of language, mind, and aesthetics. As she puts it, her research “focuses on thoughts and utterances that don’t fit standard propositional models.” Liz and Robinson spend the first third of their conversation discussing the poetry of Emily Dickinson and its connections to philosophy. They then move on to the substantial corpus of Liz’s work, touching on frames—or representational devices—various difficult-to-analyze speech acts and devices like insinuation and metaphor, and the semantics of maps. Keep up with Liz and her research at http://www.elisabethcamp.org.  OUTLINE: 00:00 Introduction 3:30 Liz’s Interest in Figurative Language 12:03 Emily Dickinson’s “The first Day’s Night had come” 29:03 Emily Dickinson’s “This World is not Conclusion” 42:36 Mary’s Room as a Literary Creation 49:46 Imaginative Resistance 58:44 Frames as Representational Devices 1:07:34 Liz’s Taste in Problems 1:11:23 Speech Acts 1:16:41 John Searle 1:23:54 Insinuation 1:47:42 Sarcasm 1:51:00 Metaphors 2:19:42 Slurs 2:32:42 Metaphors in Science 2:40:53 Maps and Sentences 2:57:53 Animal Minds and Mental Language 3:05:37 Cognitive Science at Rutgers  Robinson’s Website: http://robinsonerhardt.com  Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between. 

Elisabeth Camp is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, where she works on the philosophy of language, mind, and aesthetics. As she puts it, her research “focuses on thoughts and utterances that don’t fit standard propositional models.” Liz and Robinson spend the first third of their conversation discussing the poetry of Emily Dickinson and its connections to philosophy. They then move on to the substantial corpus of Liz’s work, touching on frames—or representational devices—various difficult-to-analyze speech acts and devices like insinuation and metaphor, and the semantics of maps. Keep up with Liz and her research at <a href="http://www.elisabethcamp.org" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">http://www.elisabethcamp.org</a>. OUTLINE: 00:00 Introduction 3:30 Liz’s Interest in Figurative Language 12:03 Emily Dickinson’s “The first Day’s Night had come” 29:03 Emily Dickinson’s “This World is not Conclusion” 42:36 Mary’s Room as a Literary Creation 49:46 Imaginative Resistance 58:44 Frames as Representational Devices 1:07:34 Liz’s Taste in Problems 1:11:23 Speech Acts 1:16:41 John Searle 1:23:54 Insinuation 1:47:42 Sarcasm 1:51:00 Metaphors 2:19:42 Slurs 2:32:42 Metaphors in Science 2:40:53 Maps and Sentences 2:57:53 Animal Minds and Mental Language 3:05:37 Cognitive Science at Rutgers Robinson’s Website: <a href="http://robinsonerhardt.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">http://robinsonerhardt.com</a> Robinson Erhardt researches symbolic logic and the foundations of mathematics at Stanford University. Join him in conversations with philosophers, scientists, weightlifters, artists, and everyone in-between.

70 - Elisabeth Camp: Emily Dickinson, Figurative Language, and Representation

I ask the philosopher Elisabeth Camp five questions about herself.  Elisabeth Camp is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. She is the author of “Slurring Perspectives” (2013), “Thinking with Maps” (2007), and other essays in the philosophy of language and mind.

I ask the philosopher Elisabeth Camp five questions about herself. Elisabeth Camp is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. She is the author of “Slurring Perspectives” (2013), “Thinking with Maps” (2007), and other essays in the philosophy of language and mind.

This is a recording of: Pictures and Propositions 13th – 14th June 2016 Senate House, Senate Room This conference brings philosophers from art and aesthetics working on pictorial representation together with philosophers of mind and language working on the nature of content. We believe that each party is well positioned to offer new insights to the other. For example, by attending to representational pictures, might we shed light on the nature and structure of content, an issue that has seen a recent revival in the philosophy of language but which has focused almost exclusively on sentential representation. Closely related, what can be said about ‘pictorial content’? Should we conceive of the contents of pictures as of a different, non-propositional category or might they be assimilated to the more familiar domain? And how are the contents of pictures determined? If visual aspects of a picture underdetermine its content, might linguistic resources such as presupposition or implicature help fill out what’s represented? These questions and more will be taken up by our panel of speakers. Please do not cite or reproduce this material without written permission of the author We thank the British Society of Aesthetics for their generous support. For more information, visit http://www.londonaetheticsforum.org The London Aesthetics Forum is an initiative of the Institute of Philosophy. (http://philosophy.sas.ac.uk)

This is a recording of: <h1>Pictures and Propositions</h1> <h2>13th – 14th June 2016 Senate House, Senate Room</h2> This conference brings philosophers from art and aesthetics working on pictorial representation together with philosophers of mind and language working on the nature of content. We believe that each party is well positioned to offer new insights to the other. For example, by attending to representational pictures, might we shed light on the nature and structure of content, an issue that has seen a recent revival in the philosophy of language but which has focused almost exclusively on sentential representation. Closely related, what can be said about ‘pictorial content’? Should we conceive of the contents of pictures as of a different, non-propositional category or might they be assimilated to the more familiar domain? And how are the contents of pictures determined? If visual aspects of a picture underdetermine its content, might linguistic resources such as presupposition or implicature help fill out what’s represented? These questions and more will be taken up by our panel of speakers. Please do not cite or reproduce this material without written permission of the author We thank the British Society of Aesthetics for their generous support. For more information, visit <a href="http://www.londonaetheticsforum.org" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">http://www.londonaetheticsforum.org</a> The London Aesthetics Forum is an initiative of the Institute of Philosophy. (<a href="http://philosophy.sas.ac.uk" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">http://philosophy.sas.ac.uk</a>)

Pictures and Propositions: Elisabeth Camp