Ranked #1
21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
21 - Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
We discuss repeated games, aiming to unpack the intuition that the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment in th... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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Ranked #2
16 - Backward induction: reputation and duels
16 - Backward induction: reputation and duels
In the first half of the lecture, we consider the chain-store paradox. We discuss how to build the idea of reputation in... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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Ranked #3
03 - Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
03 - Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
We apply the main idea from last time, iterative deletion of dominated strategies, to analyze an election where candidat... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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Ranked #4
04 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
04 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, w... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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Ranked #5
18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
18 - Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
We consider games that have both simultaneous and sequential components, combining ideas from before and after the midte... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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Ranked #6
19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
We analyze three games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves player... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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Ranked #7
15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
15 - Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
We first discuss Zermelo's theorem: that games like tic-tac-toe or chess have a solution. That is, either there is a way... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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Ranked #8
14 - Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
14 - Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
We first apply our big idea--backward induction--to analyze quantity competition between firms when play is sequential, ... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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Ranked #9
13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
We consider games in which players move sequentially rather than simultaneously, starting with a game involving a borrow... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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Ranked #10
12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that... Read more
7 Oct 2009
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