Paul Tucker - The Sense Of Discovering Our Belovedness
Rev. Paul Tucker is the minister at the Brush Hill Cumberland Presbyterian Church in Nashville, Tennessee. In our conversation, Paul talks about the strong sense of wanting to serve an intergenerational congregation, Henri Nouwen, and the Church at its best is one of humility. Music is provided by Pierce Murphy, Caldera Blue. Source: https://www.freemusicarchive.org/music/Pierce_Murphy/through-the-olive-branches/caldera-blueComments: http://freemusicarchive.org/Additional comments: modifications made to shorten and loop song for introduction and closing of podcast.Copyright Attribution and License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Sir Paul Tucker on what central banks should do now
In this episode of BM Talks we are joined by Sir Paul Tucker who reveals: Why central banks are struggling to communicate their actionsWhat QE is doing needs to be examinedHow QE works must be better explainedDebt needs to be termed outHow Shadow Banks remain a significant risk to the marketHow fiscal policy can coordinate but not dominate monetary policy"We should be relying on the central banks to do what they definitely can do and using the fiscal authority to do something that they can more certainly do than the central bank, which is to get spending going" "Some MPC members now talk as if QE is mainly a signalling device. If they do, then their votes for the scale of QE are completely inexplicable" "The extraordinary "Non-QE" QE in March.... It’s pretty hard to make sense of the March and April interventions... without thinking that this is price support"
13. Summary of our Annual General Meeting (AGM) with Chair Tracey Wedd & Chair of Rugby Paul Tucker
House of Rams
In this quick episode Paul Eynon meets with Tracey and Tux immediately following the AGM. We met in the bar following the meeting. In this special edition of our podcast we will have a quick chat about the topics discussed in the AGM. We cover reports from the chair, finance, rugby along the appointment of Executive Officers for the coming year. Please note, as this is a public format, should members want to learn more look out for the email updates.
This week Paul joins us to talk about Joystick, Betty White Tit Fuck tours, and so much more I’m sure I don’t think anyone reads this so I’ll be honest I edited the podcast then I got stoned so I forget we talk about and well it’s time to publish so don’t forget to follow us on Twitter @tourpasspodcast
Republican $1tn plan, Paul Tucker on damage limits
FT News in Focus
The FT News Briefing is a rundown of the global business stories you need to know for the coming day, from the newsroom of the Financial Times. If you enjoy it, subscribe to the FT News Briefing wherever you get your podcasts, or listen at FT.com/newsbriefing.Friday, March 20Republicans in the US Senate have introduced legislation to inject more than $1tn of fiscal stimulus into the economy as it grapples with the coronavirus outbreak. Sir Paul Tucker, the former deputy governor of the Bank of England and current chair of the Systemic Risk Council, says it’s time for policymakers and bankers to prepare for a wartime setting if conditions deteriorate. Plus, the only US drugmaker that makes a potential treatment for the coronavirus raised the price nearly 100 per cent in January as the outbreak wreaked havoc in China. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Paul Tucker on Central Bank Independence and *Unelected Power*
Macro Musings with David Beckworth
Paul Tucker is a 33-year veteran of the Bank of England where he served as both a member and deputy governor of the Monetary Policy Committee. Currently, Paul is a senior fellow at Harvard and a chair at the Systemic Risk Council. He has also recently authored a book, *Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State* and joins the show today to discuss talk about it. David and Paul also discuss central bank independence and justifications for the existence of a regulatory state as well as Paul’s “principles for delegation” criteria. Transcript for the episode: https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/podcasts/03252019/paul-tucker-central-bank-independence-and-unelected-power Paul’s website: http://paultucker.me/ Paul’s Harvard University profile: https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/people/001970-paul-tucker Related Links: *Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State* by Paul Tucker https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11240.html David’s blog: macromarketmusings.blogspot.com David’s Twitter: @DavidBeckworth
Paul Tucker – Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State
The Rhodes Center Podcast
Watch accompanying talk at the Watson Institute at Brown University: [https://youtu.be/R-Dxrs7dj0w]Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power [https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11240.html] lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens.Paul Tucker [https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/people/001970-paul-tucker] draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power.Like it or not, unelected power has become a hallmark of modern government. This critically important book shows how to harness it to the people's purposes.Sir Paul Tucker is chair of the Systemic Risk Council. He is a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and the author of Unelected Power, published in 2018 by Princeton University Press. Previously, he was Deputy Governor at the Bank of England, sitting on its monetary policy, financial stability, and prudential policy committees. Internationally, he was a member of the G20 Financial Stability Board, leading its work on too big to fail; a director of the Bank for International Settlements, and chair of its Committee for Payment and Settlement Systems. His other activities include being a director at Swiss Re, a senior fellow at the Harvard Center for European Studies, a Visiting Fellow of Nuffield College Oxford, and a Governor of the Ditchley Foundation.You can read a transcript of this episode here: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/17pQ8eWNLgLgqqowwVhrXCuIRmLal9JQd/view?usp=sharing]
LFP113 – Special Episode! Regulators – Unelected Power & Uncertain Constitutional Position w/Sir Paul Tucker former Deputy Governor Bank of England
London Fintech Podcast
This is the most important topic for our democracy. What is the constitutional position of regulators? Are they a 4th branch of the State or subsidiary to the existing 3 (executive, legislature, law)? Amazingly no-one knows and modern constitutional law textbooks make no mention. Is the spirit of Magna Carta which set in train the restraint of arbitrary questionable power over us dead when people we have no ability to hire and fire rule our lives in ever greater minute detail? Their reach. Our lives these days are shaped in the UK (mut. mut. elsewhere) by the likes of OfCom, Ofgem, ONR, Ofwat, ASA, BBFC, CMA, EHRC, GBGB, ISPO, OGA, SHC, CAA, ORR, CQC, NHSI, CNHC, GCC, FCA, PSR, PRA, EA – in total 90 regulators in the UK :-O And that’s before we mention quangos (NDPB’s non-departmental public bodies) which in the UK employed 111,000 in 2009. As we heard in LFP112 the FCA is currently proposing to de-democratise P2P. How can they have these powers? Who are they to remove your freedom or mine. I mean that sincerely – its one thing if parliament removes our freedoms, thats bad enough but at least we can vote the government out. We have no such choice when it comes to the FCA or any of the other proli9ferating regulators. Their cost. Furthermore all this bureaucracy and micromanagement of our lives does not come cheap. In UK-FS the cost of BoE/PRA/FCA has increased six-fold since 2000 The cost of the 90 regulators is direct expenditure of £4bn and indirectly are believed to cost industry £100bn p.a. to comply (source: National Audit Office). Does it work? Lord Turner in LFP065 agreed w/r/t FS with Niall Ferguson’s “excessively complex regulation has become the disease for which it purports to be the cure”. John Kay in LFP055 also felt, like I, that in FS this new approach was leading to more crises not fewer. Asymmetric risk profile of regulators. In essence there is no cost to retraining Gulliver’s freedom down with one more thread, one more paragraph of regulation but they run a huge risk if Gulliver goes on a bender and trashes the local village. There is little downside for them in the short term in reducing the freedom of citizens to do what the hell they want. However when something goes wrong – and it always does – there is hysteria and political calls for public flogging of regulators. What would you do in those circs if you worked in a regulator? Sir Paul Tucker not only has 34yrs experience at the BoE, as well as roles on the broader banking stage, he is now a research fellow at Harvard, and chairs the Systemic Risk Council a body set up in 2012 of wise elders such as Paul Volcker, Lord Turner, Jean-Claude Trichet, Paul O’Neill, John Reed and many more who advise current regulators. All of this in itself would be more than sufficient to have clear insights into regulation per se. However above and beyond all this Paul has spent several years working on a super-impressive tome called “Unelected Power – The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State” and has thus been thinking super-deeply about the topic. The book itself is well over 500pp with an astonishing 30pp bibliography and is guaranteed to become a reference work in this topic. None less than Paul Volcker says of the book “Paul Tucker has written a most timely and thoughtful analysis of the role of independent agencies in democratic societies.” Paul is also not arguing from any position of “leave it to the mandarins” as cynics might think. Both he and the governor Mervyn King argued against the BoE being given excessively enhanced powers post-crisis. He has said “Too much govt power lies in the hands of unelected regulators” and would have subtitled the book “How technocracy should retreat to preserve our system of government and in its own interests”. Another comment I warmed to was “policy makers should refrain from participating in many other and broader issues confronting their societies”. So it’s a super-important episode for us all as citizens let alone for the development of Fintech and FS. And a super long intro to the show notes which I will wrap up with a quote from inside the cover of the book: “Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens…Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power. Like it or not, unelected power has become a hallmark of modern government. This critically important book shows how to harness it to the people’s purposes.” Topics discussed include: I wonder whether Wolverhampton is the centre of world control Football Paul’s career including Hong Kong Basel’s origins in 1974 Herstatt crisis “daylight credit exposures” “the big change in our adult lifetime in Europe is the shift away from a model of State intervention based on public ownership and control to privatisation and regulation.” “the privatisation of near-monopolies and the regulation of them as utilities” the rationale for this re stability of outlook less affected by the political cycle whilst insurance regulation goes back to the 19thC everywhere, in the UK banking regulation doesn’t have a statutory form until the mid 1970s! it came in with the secondary banking crisis and as a result of EU law… what happened with the secondary crisis and how there were holes in the informal regulatory oversight of the BoE by 2007 the focus of the FSA had shifted from this to whether customers were getting a good service Byzantine Empire regulatory structure echoed for a thousand years self-regulation – when it works background to Big Bang the missed opportunity to create an SEC in the 1980s the problem with the SROs the over-reaction re the overly ambitious remit of the FSA the FSA central banking and supervision “the Labour government did a good job in the way it designed the BoE as a monetary policy body” however the changes to regulation weren’t particularly debated, they were just announced the real reason Eddie George (the then governor of the BoE) was annoyed in 1997/98 “one of the themes of my book is don’t delegate power to technocrats without public debate” Paul’s talk on youtube “LSE Events: Unelected Power: the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state” in some regulators there is not a committee making a decision but one person! (esp in utility regulators) the day this was recorded OfCom made a recommendation to government about the regulation of social media platforms – one person’s decision! [MB: Not on the podcast, but having looked into this later myself it seems to me tp be another example of “regulator regulates the people” – FB, Twitter et al do not produce content – you and I do…] the benefit of voting as with the BoE with interest rates where votes are published along with the minority opinion what regulations really are [check it out at 27:15] the South Sea Company, the Bank of England and politics how long it takes to regulate a culture the need to understand the market by direct experience rather than “distant bureaucracy” balancing closeness and distance from the regulated industry regulation has grown-up in an unprincipled way we need principles for regulation per se [some are suggested in Paul’s book] three types of regulatory distance from government – completely insulated (eg Bundesbank), semi-insulated (need annual budgets approved) and when “at beck and call” (Executive Agencies in the UK) France has taken the lead in coming up with principles and implementing them the need to find a vocabulary that make sense to regular people regulators, regulation, and regulating secondary legislation and the reaction the need for clear objectives what to do when you can’t the movement in the FSA from disclosure enforcement to wanting to regulate products (which relates entirely to the current FCA/P2P hoo-ha) Paul’s advice to the FSA in re “we ended up with a halfway house, there was next to no public debate about it” how the SEC copes with differing objectives and emphases changing strategy steers versus long shopping lists the ever-increasing length of regulation people are less inclined to follow the spirit of rules than they were the culture of trying to stop anything going wrong big picture versus detail/certainty common law and restrained judges in the UK are regulators under the triangle of branches of the state or part of a new square? congress blaming regulators whereas the solution lies with congress! “politicians have discovered that its quite convenient for them in the short run to shift the decisions to unelected technocrats” in FS with Dodd-Frank an awful lot just says to the SEC et al “can you go and fix X” Sir Humphrey and Yes Minister in re the huge importance of select committees for our democracy re regulators constitutional law books totally overlook this huge change!! “We shouldn’t refer to them as regulations we should refer to them as laws because that’s what they are” Mervyn King and Paul Tucker’s positions on BoE powers in the changes post-2008 Napoleonic Code and US legalism proportionality we’ve allowed the structure of governance in the UK to change profoundly in a casual way that doesn’t live up to our long heritage of careful consideration of governing the Systemic Risk Council’s work And much much more Share and enjoy!
The Institute for Government was delighted to welcome Paul Tucker, author of Unelected Power, for an in conversation event with Bronwen Maddox, Director of the Institute for Government.They discussed key themes from the book, including how we can ensure central bankers and other unelected policy makers remain stewards of the common good. Sir Paul Tucker is a Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and Chair of the Systemic Risk Council. For over thirty years, he was a central banker and regulator at the Bank of England, and the Bank for International Settlements.